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Essay

Common Law, Common Ground, and
Jefferson's Principle
David A. Strausst

1. INTRODUCTION

Why do we care about the Framers of the Constitution? After all, they
lived long ago, in a world that was different in countless ways from ours.
Why does it matter what their views were, for any reasons other than purely
historical ones? And if we don't care about the Framers, why do we care
about their handiwork, the Constitution itself? It was the product of the
Framers' times and the Framers' sensibilities. What possible reason can we
have for allowing its provisions to rule us today? Even if the Founding
generation was exceptionally visionary and enlightened, we would not
allow ourselves to be ruled by even the most extraordinary group of people
if they lived in another country halfway across the world today. Why do we
allow ourselves to be ruled by the decisions of people who lived in a time
that was, in every relevant respect, much further away than that?
These might seem to be the most academic of questions. No one
seriously disputes that the Constitution is supreme law, and nearly everyone
acknowledges that the views of the Framers matter to some degree.
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Academic or not, though, these questions are important because throughout
constitutional law, the role of text and original understandings remains
uncertain. Until we have tried to answer the most fundamental skeptical
question-why do we care at all about the Framers?-we will not know
what role the text and the original understandings should play.
The role of the text and the original understandings may be as much in
dispute today as it has ever been. In some areas-federalism, the right to
keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment, the Eighth
Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment, the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment-there is a concerted effort
underway, by advocates and sometimes by judges and Justices, to make
constitutional law conform more closely to what are said to be the dictates
of the text and the original understandings.' To what extent should the
original understandings govern the interpretation of those provisions, or of
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, or the Fourth Amendment,
or the Self-Incrimination or Just Compensation Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment, or the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or the structural provisions of the original
Constitution? Critics have powerfully attacked the notion that constitutional
interpretation can rely exclusively on the text and the original
understandings; 2 but as long as the text and original understandings play
some role in constitutional interpretation-as essentially everyone agrees
they must-these issues about the role of text and original understandings
will remain with us, and we will have to address the fundamental question
of why the Framers matter at all.
There is no agreed-upon answer to that question. It has been asked
before: It was Thomas Jefferson's question at the time of the Founding.
"[T]he earth belongs to the living, and not to the dead," he wrote to James
Madison from Paris in 1789; 3 so how can any constitution purport to bind
1. For recent general efforts to establish that the text and the Framers' intentions should

govern constitutional interpretation, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); and Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999
Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000). On the

particular areas mentioned in the text, see, for example, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
904-15 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-94 (1991) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); and Jack N. Rakove, The Second
Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.

103, 106-07 (2000)

(describing the near-exclusive reliance on onginalism by advocates of an individual Second
Amendment right to bear arms).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13-25 (2001);

Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
On the history of attacks on originalism, see Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary
Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1998).
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 396 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr., eds., 1958) [hereinafter
Letter of Sept. 6, 1789].
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later generations? Jefferson was not alone in raising the question at that
time-he was not even the most extreme skeptic-but his formulation was
the most memorable.
The problem is that Jeffersonian skepticism is very difficult to rebut, on
one level, but wholly unpersuasive on another. It is, in fact, hard for anyone
who believes in self-government to come up with an explanation for why
long-ago generations should have such a decided effect on our law today,
whether they are the generation of the Founding, or the Civil War, or any
other. But at the same time, Jeffersonian skepticism about the Constitution
seems out of touch with the reality of our political and legal culture, or even
our culture more generally. Many people revere the Constitution. Many
Americans consider themselves connected, in some important way, to
earlier generations. American law today seems like a chapter in a
multigenerational project, and its multigenerational character is part of the
reason it is valued. To many people, allegiance to the Constitution and a
certain kind of respect for the Founding, and for crucial episodes in our
history, are central to what it means to be an American. All of those
attitudes are deeply incompatible with Jefferson's kind of skepticism, and
as long as those attitudes remain widespread, Jefferson's skepticism will
always seem to many to be a little like a debating point-clever and hard to
answer, but somehow deeply wrong.
In this Essay, I want to address these issues in a way that responds to
Jefferson-that gives a reason for paying attention to the Constitution that
ought to satisfy even a Jeffersonian skeptic-but that also accommodates
more deeply held views about the Constitution and American traditions,
rather than dismissing those views as mysticism or ancestor worship in the
way that Jefferson's skepticism seems to dismiss them. The first part of the
answer to Jefferson is confession and avoidance: To a large extent,
American constitutional law has developed in a way that is independent of
the views of the Founding generation. Much of American constitutional law
consists of precedents that have evolved in a common-law-like way, with a
life and a logic of their own. But it would be a mistake to say that American
constitutional law consists entirely of precedents and is independent of the
text and the Framers. The text, unquestionably, and the original
understandings, to a lesser degree, continue to play a significant role. We
cannot escape Jefferson's question by saying that we have left the Framers
behind.
The central answer to Jefferson is that the text of the Constitution
provides a common ground among people, and in that way it facilitates the
resolution of disputes that might otherwise be intractable. Sometimes, in the
familiar formulation, it is more important that things be settled than that
they be settled right, and the provisions of the Constitution settle things.
The Constitution tells us how long a President's term will be, how many
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senators each state will have, whether there are to be jury trials in criminal
cases, and many other things. Even if the rules the Constitution prescribes
are not the best possible rules, they serve the very valuable function of
providing an answer so that we do not have to keep reopening those issues
all the time.
These justifications, as I will explain, ought to satisfy even the most
iconoclastic Jeffersonian skeptic. Equally important, they fit with our
current practices of constitutional interpretation. The common law and
common ground justifications make sense of the way we interpret the
Constitution, including aspects of our practice of constitutional
interpretation that otherwise seem quite problematic. The common law and
common ground justifications should therefore be acceptable to anyone
who finds our current constitutional order generally acceptable, even if that
person wants to reject, A la Jefferson, anything that might remotely look like
ancestor worship.
But at the same time, the common law and common ground
justifications do not require anyone to reject more reverential views of the
Constitution and the Framers. People who believe, as some do, that the
Framers were divinely inspired can accept the common law and common
ground justifications; in fact, they have an especially strong reason for
accepting those justifications. People who, less dramatically, see
themselves as part of an ongoing American tradition that embraces earlier
generations also have good reasons to accept those justifications. But
people who want to debunk all of that-or who identify with other
traditions, religious or ethnic traditions perhaps, that have nothing to do
with the Framers-can also accept the common law and common ground
justifications. The key idea here is Rawls's famous notion of the
overlapping consensus. People who adhere to widely and fundamentally
different belief systems, such as different religions, can nonetheless all
embrace certain common principles, as can people who reject any religious
belief system. That is the kind of justification that adherence to the
Constitution and the original understandings requires, and the common law
and common ground justifications can, I believe, provide it.
In Part II, I will describe Jefferson's argument, the answers that have
customarily been given to it, why those answers are not fully adequate, and
how the common law and common ground justifications might provide an
answer. In Part III, I will elaborate on the suggestion that part of the answer
to Jefferson is that constitutional law has developed in a common-law-like
way that is, to a significant extent, independent of the text and the Framers'
understandings. Then, in Part IV, I will describe the "common ground"
justification for adhering to the text and original understandings on those
limited but important occasions when we do so. In Part V, I will try to show
how this "common ground" justification makes sense out of current
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practices that would otherwise be problematic, and I will discuss other
implications of that justification for constitutional interpretation.
II. JEFFERSON'S PRINCIPLE

A.

"The earth belongs... to the living."

"The earth belongs in usufruct to the living," 4 Jefferson wrote to
Madison in 1789. "[T]he question Whether one generation of men has a
right to bind another, seems never to have been started either on this or our
side of the water," even though "it is a question of such consequences
as... [to] place... among the fundamental principles of every
government." 5 Jefferson's answer to the question was no: "We seem not to
have perceived that, by the law of nature, one generation is to another as
one independent nation to another." 6 Therefore, Jefferson said, "[elvery
constitution... and every law" should "naturally expire[] at the end of 19
years." 7 (Jefferson elaborately calculated, on the basis of life expectancies
at the time, that a majority of people twenty-one and older would die within
nineteen years and concluded that was the best measure of a generation's
life span.)8 If any law "be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of
9
right."
Jefferson's argument, in some form, goes back at least to Hume's essay
Of the Original Contract.) It was a repeated refrain of Thomas Paine's. II
Others besides Jefferson made similar arguments at the time of the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution; Noah Webster, in particular, ridiculed
Jefferson for not holding the principle more consistently. 12
Jefferson's principle remains, today, the central challenge to written
constitutionalism-indeed, perhaps to more than that, since much ordinary
legislation is also the product of earlier generations. And to this day, it is

4. Id. at 392 (emphasis omitted).
5. Id.

6. Id. at 395.
7. Id. at 396.
8. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1395, 1402 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) [hereinafter Letter of July 12,
1816]; see also Letter of Sept. 6, 1789, supra note 3, at 393-94.
9. Letter ofSept. 6, 1789, supranote 3, at 396.
10. See DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 164, 168 (Stuart D.
Warner & Donald W. Livingston eds., 1994).
I1. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, in RIGHTS OF MAN, COMMON SENSE 1, 12
(1994) [hereinafter PAINE, Rights of Man]; THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in THE LIFE AND
MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 1, 29, 37 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961).
12. See NOAH WEBSTER, On Government, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND FUGITIVE
WRITINGS ON MORAL, HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY SUBJECTS 67-68 (Boston,

Thomas & Andrews 1790). See generally STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON
THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 137-50 (1995).
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not clear how to answer Jefferson's argument. "This principle that the earth
belongs to the living, and not to the dead, is of very extensive application
Jefferson said.13 In our own legal
and consequences, in every country ...
culture, the question is, among other things, why the generations who
drafted the Constitution of 1787, or the Bill of Rights, or the post-Civil War
amendments to the Constitution have a right to rule us today. Specifically,
why do we care about their intentions, which are generally thought to have
some importance to current constitutional controversies? And, more
pressing, why do we even care about the documents they adopted, which
everyone today would acknowledge to be in some sense authoritative?
,"

B. Commands and IntergenerationalObligations
In the American constitutional tradition, most of the answers that have
been offered to these. questions take one of two general forms. One kind of
answer might be called Austinian, after John Austin's view that law is a
command issued by a sovereign.' 4 This answer to Jefferson's question
asserts that the decisions of the earlier generations bind us in essentially the
way that an order from a bureaucratic superior binds a subordinate. 15 Often
this view seems to be not even asserted but assumed; people try to uncover
what the Founding generation, or subsequent generations, thought about an
issue without explaining why that would be significant today.
A second, more complex kind of answer relies not so much on a simple
model of superior and subordinate, but rather on a conception of
intergenerational identity. We owe "fidelity" to the earlier generations
because we live in the same political community, extended over time, as
they. Just as part of being an American is acknowledging obligations of
mutuality with others who live today, so part of being an American is to
maintain continuity with those earlier generations. One way we do that is to
adhere, at least to some degree, to their decisions on questions of

13. See Letter of Sept. 6, 1789, supra note 3.
14. See JOHN AUSTIN, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, in THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 1, 36-42
(H.L.A. Hart ed., 1954).
15. For an especially clear statement of this view, although one primarily concerned with
statutory interpretation, scc RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-61
(1990). The view is also clearly expressed, although less self-consciously, in ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 5, 145, 178, 300 (1990).

See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 363, 375
(1992); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 353-60 (1981).
The idea that the objective of constitutional interpretation is to translate the statements of an
authoritative group of lawgivers into terms more applicable to today's issues also reflects this
Austinian view. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1182 (1993)
("Firm within our legal culture is the conviction that if judges have any duty it is a duty of fidelity
to texts drafted by others, whether by Congress or the Framers .... ").
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constitutional law. Many
theories take this second form; some meld aspects
6
of these two forms.'
The first kind of answer, with its simple Austinian model-the
Founders were the sovereign, and their commands bind us-seems at first
glance just to refuse to engage Jefferson's argument. But this approach
cannot be disregarded entirely. As Jefferson acknowledged, at least for a
time a majority is entitled to rule. Any account of constitutional
interpretation has to explain the undoubted binding force of a
contemporaneous majoritarian decision.
The second kind of answer, asserting a conception of intergenerational
identity, is deeply woven into the way many people think about the
Constitution. It speaks to something important. There is undoubtedly a
human need, widely if not universally felt, to understand oneself as part of
an ongoing tradition and to have a connection to earlier generations.17 This
is often the way in which people understand themselves to be part of an
ethnic group or a religious tradition. Many accounts that are implicitly
offered to answer Jefferson's objection provide conceptions of what it is to
be an American, conceptions that include fidelity to earlier generations'
decisions about the Constitution.18
But the analogies to religious and ethnic identity ought to give us pause
about using this kind of explanation for the binding character of the
Constitution. People alive today in the United States, or any other

16. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) seems to me to take this second view.
Especially relevant is id. at 188-202. Jeremy Waldron, Precommitment and Disagreement, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 271, 287-92 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) is

more explicit in defending the notion of an intergenerational community. Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1515-24 (1988) contains an illuminating criticism of the
Austinian aspects of Dworkin's view, and Frank Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 64, appears to endorse an idea of
intergenerational community as well. Among recent writers who endorse a view of this kind, see,

for example, Friedman & Smith, supra note 2. See also id. at 80-85; Symposium, Fidelity in
ConstitutionalTheory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (1997).
17. Edmund Burke's statement of this position is classic:
[O]ne of the first and most leading principles on which the commonwealth and the laws
are consecrated, is lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful of
what they have received from their ancestors, or of what is due to thcir posterity, should
act as if they were the entire masters .... By this unprincipled facility of changing the
state as often, and as much, and in as many ways as there are floating fancies or
fashions, the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be broken. No
one generation could link with the other. Men would become little better than the flies
of a summer.
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 192-93 (Conor Cruise O'Brien
ed, Penguin Books 1968) (1790). In the legal literature, the leading statement is perhaps Anthony
T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition,99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
18. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 154-62 (1991) seems essentially
to take this view, as does JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001). Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The
New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV.

29, 99-103 (1999) also appears sympathetic to this view.
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reasonably heterogeneous community, will define the tradition to which
they belong in different ways. Relatively few people alive today are even
descended from the people who participated in the great constitutional
decisions of the past. This is the result of both immigration and the
enfranchisement of a much larger percentage of the population, changes
that make Jefferson's question all the more difficult to answer.
Nearly all of us are being asked to accept decisions made not by our
own ancestors, which would be troubling enough, but by someone else's
ancestors. Individuals might choose to do so; they might choose to consider
themselves part of an American tradition that includes the Framers or the
post-Civil War generation. But it is difficult to see why people who do not
feel themselves part of that tradition-who identify primarily with a
different ethnic, religious, or cultural tradition, or with no tradition at allshould be told that they have to identify with this particular American
tradition as well. And if we are unwilling to tell them that-as we should
be-then this second kind of justification for adhering to the Constitution
will not work.
To put the point another way, the justification for using a written
Constitution, and following original intentions, should not be sectarian. It
should not depend on a particular conception of what it is to be an
American. It should be something that can appeal to any reasonable
member of our society today, even to people who reject the idea of
belonging to any American cultural or quasi-ethnic tradition, and even to
people who-following the logic of Jefferson's skepticism-adhere to no
tradition at all.
C. Common Law, Common Ground,and the
Idea of an OverlappingConsensus
The way to try to develop such a conception, I believe, is to recognize
that the decisions of earlier generations can be binding today even in the
absence of any kind of obligation of obedience-either the straightforward
obligation of a subordinate to a superior, or the more complex idea of
"fidelity" to an earlier generation. Jefferson may be right that we do not
owe anything, in any sense, to earlier generations. But his skeptical
conclusion does not follow. There are at least two other possible reasons
why we might care about what earlier generations did.
First, a decision made by an earlier generation might serve as a
precedent. In a common law system, precedents from earlier eras bind to a
degree. Nevertheless, the problem Jefferson identified is greatly
ameliorated in a common law system, or so I shall argue shortly. And the
justification for following precedent need not rely on any notion of
intergenerational identity or intergenerational obligation. There are sensible
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reasons why any rational person would be reluctant to depart from wellestablished practices that were endorsed, after due consideration, by people
in the past when they were confronted with similar issues.
Second, an earlier generation's decision-especially when it is
embodied in an authoritative text--can serve as readily accepted common
ground among people who otherwise disagree.' 9 A legal provision can settle
things, and sometimes-when it is in fact more important that things be
settled than that they be settled right-the fact of settlement alone is enough
to make the provision binding. The binding force of the provision rests on
its functional ability to settle disputes, and not at all on whether the entity
that enacted the provision is entitled to obedience or "fidelity."
Accepting the common law and common ground answers to Jefferson's
argument does not require one to reject the other kinds of answers that have
been offered. In particular, the common law and common ground
arguments are not inconsistent with, or even in tension with, the notion of
intergenerational identity-the idea that part of being an American is
honoring the decisions of earlier generations of Americans. One can hold a
particular view of the importance of the Constitution in defining American
identity and also accept the common law and common ground
justifications.
In fact, an intergenerational conception of the political community
provides an additional reason for accepting those justifications. A
conception of English identity was an important part of the early common
lawyers' ideology.20 To the extent one believes one has an obligation of
fidelity to earlier generations of Americans, one's willingness to treat their
decisions as precedents, and their enactments as common ground-as one
of the things that all Americans have in common-will be strengthened.
Belief in a quasi-ethnic American identity is not an adequate basis for
answering Jefferson's question; but it is also important not to answer that
question in a way that will require people to repudiate such beliefs, which
are widely held. The common law and common ground justifications do not
require people to repudiate those beliefs.

19. The locus classicus of this idea is DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 489-90
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford 2d ed. 1978) (1740). See also DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 125 (Charles W. Hendel ed., Bobbs-Merril 1981)

(1751). For modem discussions, see, for example, DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION 3-4, 36-42
(1969); David Gauthier, David Hume, Contractarian,88 PHIL. REV. 3, 22-24 (1979); Andrei
Marmor, Legal Conventionalism, 4 LEGAL THEORY 509, 515-27 (1998); and Gerald J. Postema,
Coordinationand Convention at the Foundationsof Law, II J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 182-97 (1982).
Frederick Schauer, Statutory Constructionand the CoordinatingFunction of PlainMeaning, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 231, 253-56, draws the specific connection to reliance on the language of an
authoritative text.
20. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 30-55
(1967).
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But the common law and common ground justifications do not depend
on any particular conception of American identity, any more than one has
to accept the common lawyers' elaborate ideas about "the ancient
constitution" of England in order to accept the common law of property or
contract. The common law and common ground justifications for
constitutional obligation rely on arguments that should appeal to all
reasonable members of the political community. This is Rawls's idea of the
"overlapping consensus": 21 People who have different ideas about
intergenerational obligation, or American identity-or who reject such
notions altogether-should all be able to say that the common ground and
common law justifications make sense.
The common law and common ground justifications explain why we
should adhere-although only in certain ways-to the text of the
Constitution and the original understandings and intentions, appropriately
defined. These justifications, I think, answer Jefferson's question in a way
that does not require people to accept a controversial conception of
American quasi-ethnic identity. But these justifications also do not require
people to be skeptical about such conceptions. People can go in different
directions when they define "what it is to be an American," while all
accepting the common law and common ground justifications for adhering
to the Constitution.
On a more concrete level, these justifications support firmly rooted
aspects of the legal culture that are otherwise difficult to explain. For
example, it is a persistent feature of American constitutional law that while
arguments based on a carcful parsing of the text of the Constitution
sometimes play a large role in resolving relatively unimportant issues, the
text plays essentially no operative role in deciding the most controversial
constitutional questions (about discrimination, fundamental rights, and
freedom of expression, for example), which are resolved on the basis of
principles derived primarily from the cases. The common ground answer to
Jefferson's question accounts for-and justifies-that apparently puzzling
feature of a system that purports to be based on a written Constitution.
Similarly, the common ground justification explains a kind of verbal
fetishism that seems to be a fixed feature of our constitutional culture: an
attachment to the specific language of the Constitution, even if the language
is being used for purposes that are unquestionably at variance with those of
the people who drafted the language. The common law and common
ground justifications also explain why we seem to accept the widespread
use, by judges and lawyers, of "law-office history": the selective use of

21. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 144-53 (1993). For the leading treatment
of a kindred idea in the legal literature, see CASS R. SUNSTErN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996).
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historical sources to support a conclusion reached partly on other grounds,
as opposed to a genuine effort to understand, in context, an earlier time.
And those justifications explain an apparently odd disjuncture in popular
attitudes to the justifications for amending the Constitution: The
Constitution is not to be "cluttered up" with detail, but many important and
widely supported amendments are highly detailed. Finally, the common law
and common ground justifications support a version of Jefferson's timebound majoritarianism: the idea that a majority's will can legitimately
govern for a while, but must recede as time passes.
D. Why Not Sunset?
Before proceeding to those issues, though, it is worth considering the
solution that Jefferson himself proposed-that there should be an automatic
sunset provision applied to all laws. In fact, this proposal is no solution at
all. But it does reveal two important things: Jefferson's problem can be
solved only by introducing an intertemporal element into interpretation, and
that intertemporal element must be able to operate gradually, not
precipitously.
The immediate difficulty with Jefferson's sunset solution is that it is
hard to see how one can specify a nonarbitrary term of years for a provision
to remain in effect. The best Jefferson could do was a convoluted
calculation that the magic period is nineteen years. But this difficulty is
actually derivative of a deeper problem: What should the law revert to after
a provision has expired? The law that existed before the provision was
adopted is the product of an even earlier generation; there is, if anything,
even less reason to impose that earlier law on the current generation.
Ideally, after a provision expires, the law should become something that the
current generation itself endorses. But how do we determine what that is?
Jefferson himself explained why it is so difficult to keep the law up to
date, in the course of rejecting the argument that "the succeeding
generation[']s... power [to] repeal" a provision "leaves them as free as if
'22
The
the constitution or law had been expressly limited to 19 years only.
power to repeal a law does not protect a later generation from the
impositions of an earlier generation:
[T]he power of repeal is not an equivalent [to mandatory
expiration]. It might indeed be if every form of government were so
perfectly contrived that the will of the majority could always be
obtained fairly and without impediment. But this is true of no form.
The people cannot assemble themselves. Their representation is

22. Letter of Sept. 6, 1789, supra note 3, at 396.
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unequal and vicious. Various checks are opposed to every
legislative proposition. Factions get possession of the public
councils. Bribery corrupts them. Personal interests lead them astray
from the general interest of their constituents: and other
impediments arise so as to prove to every practical man that a law
of limited duration is much more manageable than one which needs
a repeal.23
These familiar problems of legislative inertia and public choice do not
just prevent laws from being repealed when they no longer reflect the
majority's views; they can also prevent a majority from replacing an
expired law with something reflecting their views.24 Perhaps even after
much more than Jefferson's nineteen years, a majority of the societycomposed of some survivors of the older generation that voted on the law
and some members of the new generation that did not-wants the old law
to continue in effect. Or perhaps the view of the new majority is that the
law should be modified, but not wiped from the books. The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, for example, must be viewed today as the product of an earlier
generation, and not just in a chronological sense. But simply "sunsetting"
the Act-reverting to the pre-1964 status quo-would surely be less in
keeping with the current generation's views than the 1964 Act is itself.
Given the problems Jefferson identified with relying on repeals, we could
not view the failure to reenact the old law as a reliable indication that a
current majority rejects it. And, for similar reasons, there is no obvious way
to ascertain how the current generation would like to modify the Act.
The failure of the sunset solution, however, has two important lessons.
One is that the core of Jefferson's principle is not affected: Even if a
mandatory sunset is not the solution, the problem of one generation ruling
another remains. The second is that the interpretation of laws should not
change abruptly. Not only do generations not change abruptly, but the work
of a previous generation does not leave the scene when it does; changes that
generation has brought about in the culture will remain. "[H]istoric
continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity."" Both the
common law and the common ground arguments try to meet these
requirements. They preserve the work of the past, but only to the extent that
the past either must, unavoidably, be preserved, or should be preserved, for

23. Id.
24. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE

To IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 81-105 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article
I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992).
25. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Learning and Science, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard
Law School Association in Honor of Professor C.C. Langdell (June 25, 1895), inSPEECHES 67,
68(1934).
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good reasons. But at the same time, these approaches per-it gradual
adaptation.
III. CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE:
THE COMMON LAW ANSWER TO JEFFERSON

The text and the original understandings unquestionably play a
significant role in constitutional law, but it is far from a dominant role. Part
of the answer to Jefferson's question about why we should adhere to the
Framers' decisions is: Often, we don't. To a large extent our constitutional
law has solved Jefferson's problem by becoming a common law system in
which cases are decided on the basis of precedents, not the text.2 6 The
dispute in controverted cases is over the best reading of the precedents,
and--consistent with the approach common law courts have historically
taken-over what is fairer or more sensible policy. The common law
approach is central to many of the most important areas of constitutional
law: freedom of expression, race and gender discrimination, property rights,
police
process, federalism,
capital punishment,
procedural
due
interrogation, the limits of congressional power, implied fundamental
rights, the "case or controversy" requirement in the federal courts, state
power over interstate commerce, and state sovereign immunity.
The constitutional law governing freedom of expression is an
illustration. Today, this law consists of an elaborate doctrinal structure. One
asks whether a restriction on speech is content-based, content-neutral, or
incidental; whether the speech that is restricted is high-value or low-value;
whether the measure in question is a restriction or a subsidy. Depending on
the answers, there are further tests to be applied. (If the speech is
incitement, a version of the "clear and present danger" test; if the speech is
defamatory, a version of the standard established by New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan;27 and so on.) This body of doctrine is based in precedent and
developed over time. The spare text of the First Amendment of course
could not, by itself, generate such an elaborate set of rules, and while it is
common to impute to the Framers views about freedom of expression that

26. This claim is defended in David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation], David A.
Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE

SPEECH INTHE MODERN ERA 32 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) [hereinaftcr
Strauss, Freedom of Speech], and David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren
Court (Sept. 22, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). On the relationship between
the common-law-like development of constitutional law and textual constitutional amendments,
see David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457
(2001).
27. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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agree with modem conceptions, actual investigation of the Framers' views
has played essentially no role in the development of the law.28
The same pattern holds in all the other areas I mentioned. A lawyer
who needs to learn constitutional law in an area generally learns the cases
or, in some areas, the nonjudicial precedents. In one of the most active areas
in recent constitutional law-the principles governing the relationship
between the states and the federal government--even some of the Supreme
Court's most relentless advocates of relying on the text of the Constitution
have found themselves forced to29concede that their conclusions are based
on something other than the text.
Of course, the use of precedent itself might be challenged by a
Jeffersonian skeptic. The common law of England was a favorite target of
Tom Paine and others who made arguments like Jefferson's. 30 But the use
of precedent is much more easily defended against such a skeptical attack
than is the use of the original understandings, or even the use of the text.
The practice of following precedent can be justified in fully functional
terms, without relying on a controversial conception of national identity or
intergenerational obligation.
To some degree, the use of precedent is simply unavoidable. Neither
legal doctrine nor anything else can be created anew every day. That is a
principal lesson of the failure of Jefferson's sunset solution. The work of
the previous generation will, to some degree at least, inevitably be our
starting point, in law and elsewhere. To that extent, we have no choice but
to follow precedent. A system of constitutional law that did not build on
what has been done before may be literally inconceivable and is certainly
entirely impracticable.
In addition, there are well-known justifications for the use of precedent
that do not require the kind of ancestor worship that Jefferson attacked and
that do not appeal to sectarian conceptions of American traditions. 3' The
most familiar justification is often (if perhaps misleadingly) called
Burkean.32 In modem terms, the basis of this justification is that human

28. For an elaboration and defense of the claims made in this paragraph, see Strauss,
Freedom of Speech, supra note 26.
29. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997)
(Scalia, J.); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
30. See, e.g., PAINE, Rights of Man, supra note 11, at 12-15, 86-92.
3 1. For a discussion, citing sources, see Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 26,
at 891-97 & n.41.
32. See, e.g., I ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 17-18. The term may be a little misleading
because there is much else going on in Burke. Passages in his writing certainly endorse a belief in
intergenerational obligations. In addition, others before and after Burke articulated the same ideas.
See infra note 33. For a comprehensive effort to develop an approach to constitutional
interpretation that is Burkean in this sense, see Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism:
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rationality is bounded. The problems confronted by the legal system are
complex and multifaceted; an individual's capacity to solve them is limited.
It therefore makes sense to take seriously what has been done before, both
because it may reflect an accumulation of wisdom that is not available to
any one individual and because it provides a storehouse of trial-and-error
information on how the problems might be solved.33
These justifications for a common law approach-which relies on
precedent while gradually updating it to take account of new conditions and
to embody new insights-should be enough to satisfy a Jeffersonian
skeptic. The common law approach does not treat past decisions as binding
commands; it adheres to those decisions only because, and to the extent
that, it makes good functional sense to do so. Jefferson himself seems to
have recognized that such an evolutionary system would not present the
problems he identified. In one of his famous later letters, in which he again
endorsed periodic revisions of the Constitution, his remarks took on a
common-law-like tone, endorsing a practice of "wisely yielding to
the gradual change of circumstances" and "favoring progressive
accommodation to progressive improvement. 34 To the very considerable
extent that our constitutional law is a common law system, based on
precedent rather than text, Jefferson's challenge can be met with relative
ease.
IV. COMMON GROUND AND CONVENTIONALISM

Our constitutional system is not entirely a common law system,
however. This is a fixed point of our legal culture. In particular, no one says
that the text of the Constitution does not matter or is only advisory. You
cannot make an argument for any constitutional principle without
purporting to show, at some point, that the principle is consistent with the
text of the Constitution. And no provision of the Constitution-even an
indefensible one (like the requirement that a President be a natural born
citizen)--can be overruled in the way a precedent can.

Burkean Political Theory and ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994). See also

id. at 688-97.
33. The notion of bounded rationality originates in Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99-101 (1955). See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS
OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL (1957). For more recent treatments, see generally BOUNDED
RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerg Gigerenzer & Robert Selten eds., 2000).

For antecedents of Burke, in the common law tradition, who emphasized these notions, see,
for example, MATTHEW HALE, REFLECTIONS BY THE LRD. CHEIFE JUSTICE HALE ON MR.
HOBBES His DIALOGUE OF THE LAWE 14-15, reprintedin 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 500, 504 (2d ed. 1937); and Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 381 (K.B. 1608)

(Coke, C.J.). See generally Young, supranote 32, at 642-56.
34. Letter of July 12, 1816, supra note 8, at 1401.
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On many important issues, the text is followed exactly, even when
substantial arguments can be made that the judgments reflected in the text
have been superseded. No one seriously suggests that the age limits
specified in the Constitution for Presidents and members of Congress
should be interpreted to refer to other than chronological (earth) years
because life expectancies now are longer, that a President's term should be
more than four years because a more complicated world requires greater
continuity in office, or that states should have different numbers of senators
because they are no longer the distinct sovereign entities they once were.
This seems to reintroduce Jefferson's puzzle. Why do we universally accept
that the words written by earlier generations are binding?
The answer is that we accept those words, not because we acknowledge
the authority of earlier generations over us, but because they serve as
common ground in the way I described earlier. This matters, potentially
greatly, because it affects how we interpret these words in controversial
cases. For Jefferson's reason, the objective of interpretation is not-and
should not be-"fidelity," in any meaningful sense, to the people who
drafted or adopted the Constitution. Their judgments, including the
judgments reflected in the words they adopted, are entitled to respectful
consideration as precedents, but no more; and we have overridden their
judgments on a number of important issues. Rather, the objective, in
interpreting the text, is to make sure that the text can continue to serve as
common ground. This can be called the conventionalist justification for
relying on 35the text. The text serves as a convention, a focal point of
agreement.
In this Part, I will explain the conventionalist, or common ground,
justification for following the text and the original understandings. In
Section IV.A, I will explain how conventionalism can justify adhering to
the text of the Constitution, notwithstanding Jefferson's objection. In
Section IV.B, I will discuss why our Constitution, in particular, is wellsuited to serve as common ground in this way, and why originalism, at least
in certain rigid forms, is deeply inconsistent with the genius of the
Constitution. Section IV.C extends the conventionalist justification beyond
the text itself to the Framers' intentions and precedent. Finally, in Section
IV.D, I will try to show that the common ground account is not sectarian: It
does not depend on a contested view about what it means to adhere to
American traditions, but it also does not require that people accept
Jeffersonian skepticism about the value of the past.

35. For other conventionalist arguments for legal obligation, see sources cited supra note 19.
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A. Conventionalism and the Text
Conventionalism, as I said earlier, is a generalization of the notion that
it is more important that some things be settled than that they be settled
right. 36 Left to their own devices, people disagree about various questions,
large and small, related to how the government should be organized and
operated. In some cases, such as the President's term of office or the
number of senators, the Constitution provides answers. In many other cases,
the text limits the set of acceptable answers. This is true, for example, of the
features of the criminal justice system: Although the Bill of Rights and
other provisions of the Constitution do not prescribe exactly what the
criminal justice system will look like, certain essential features (juries,
witnesses called by the parties, representation by counsel, trials that are not
held in secret or at a place remote from the crime) must be present under
any straightforward reading of the text. Even when the constitutional
provisions are quite open-ended, as in the case of the Religion Clauses for
example, having the text of the clauses as the shared starting point at least
narrows the range of disagreement.
People who disagree about a constitutional question will often find that
although few or none of them thinks the answer provided by the text of the
Constitution is optimal-either the specific answer, if one is provided, or
the limit on the set of acceptable answers-all of them can live with the
limits that the text imposes. Moreover, not accepting the limits imposed by
the text has costs-in time and energy spent on further disputation, in social
division, and in the risk of a decision that (from the point of view of any
given actor) will be even worse than the decision that will result from
adhering to the limits imposed by the text. In these circumstances,
sometimes the best course overall may be to follow the admittedly lessthan-perfect judgment reflected in the text of the Constitution.
The text, in this way, provides what game theorists call a focal point. In
a game that has elements of both conflict and coordination, there will be
multiple equilibria, and the solution will often depend on social conventions
or other psychological facts. The most common examples are deciding
whether traffic should keep to the left or the right, or who should call back
if a telephone call is disconnected. In such circumstances, the solution will
often be the action that, simply by virtue of an accident of culture or
history, seems natural or has become habitual.
Some political disputes have roughly the structure of the so-called
"battle of the sexes" game: Each side would prefer its own first choice, but

36. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right.").
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each is willing to give up its own first choice if necessary to avoid
conflict.3 7 Although you and I may have different ideas about the optimal
length of the President's term of office, we agree that a quick resolution is
better than the uncertainty or prolonged conflict that might result if we
insisted on our respective first choices. Here, unlike the situation in which
people are deciding whether to keep to the right, there is some conflict of
interest between the parties, as well as some common interest. But in this
situation too, the outcome of the game can be determined by social
conventions that may make one solution stand out as obvious or
appropriate.38
The text of the Constitution is a particularly good focal point of this
kind. Because of the way it is regarded in our culture, it is a natural place to
look for a solution on which we can all agree, when agreement is especially
valuable. But the Constitution's cultural salience, and its usefulness in
resolving disputes-not its 39optimality or the authority of the Framers-are
the reasons for following it.
Another analogy might be between our practice of adhering to our
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Constitution and the reception of Roman
law in Europe in the late Middle Ages. Roman law, when it was
rediscovered in Western Europe, was an accessible, comprehensive, and
basically acceptable set of rules. Various peoples' purported ancestral ties
to Rome undoubtedly helped Roman law gain acceptance-another parallel
to our Constitution-but the actual promulgators of Roman law obviously
had no claim to obedience. It is also not likely that the provisions of Roman
law were the best that could be devised as an original matter. It was simply
that Roman law was a coherent body of law that was at hand, and its
40
adoption avoided the costly process of reinvention.
This is what makes the text of the Constitution binding-the practical
judgment that following this text, despite its drawbacks, is on balance a
good thing to do because it resolves issues that have to be resolved one way
or the other. Every time the text is ignored or obviously defied, its ability to
serve as common ground, as a focal point, is weakened. On the other hand,
every time we plausibly demonstrate that a conclusion we have reached can
be reconciled with the language of the Constitution, we make it easier for

37. In the traditional statement of the "battle of the sexes" game, A wants to go to the ballet,
and B wants to go to a boxing match, but each would prefer to sacrifice his or her preference in
order to be with the other. The game apparently originated in R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD
RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 90-94 (1957).

38. For example, see the argument in DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC
MODELLING 101-02, 143-44 (1990).
39. For this kind of use of the "battle of the sexes" game, see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT 103-04 (1999); and Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation,supra note 26, at 91011.
40. See, e.g., PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 61-63, 71-101 (1999).
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the Constitution-either the same provision or some other provision-to
serve the function of narrowing or eliminating disagreement. We will have
to put up with a malapportioned Senate and with disqualifying naturalized
citizens from the presidency, but we will gain by narrowing or eliminating
disagreement on many other issues.
This common ground, or conventionalist, justification for treating the
text as binding is based both on the interest of society as a whole and on the
requirements of fairness. It will not always be in the self-interest of every
individual to follow the text. Any one individual might, in theory, be better
off if he can follow his own judgments where they diverge from the text but
can insist that others adhere to the text where he agrees with it. But often
everyone will be better off if everyone follows the text than if people
generally insist on their own judgments. In these circumstances, the
argument for following the text rests on a basic principle of fairness: It is
unfair to take advantage of others' cooperation in a mutually beneficial
scheme if one does not cooperate oneself. The argument may also be
consequentialist: It may be that if one person cheats, by failing to follow the
text, others are more likely to cheat too, and soon the ability of the text to
coordinate behavior will be lost, to everyone's detriment.
B. Conventionalism, Originalism,and the Genius of the Framers
What makes the Constitution of the United States a good focal point, so
that adhering to it might be justified on conventionalist grounds? After all,
this conventionalist justification for following the text will not work for just
any text. It will make sense only if certain things are true of the text. For
example, if the text were entirely open-ended-if it did not prescribe
anything in any case-it could not serve as common ground in the
conventionalist sense. More important, if the text forced truly unacceptable
outcomes on us, the drawbacks of using it as a focal point might outweigh
the gains. It might still be possible for certain provisions to be focal even if
others were disregarded; it is difficult to figure out, as a matter of social
psychology, just what makes something an effective focal point. But surely
we are much more likely to get the conventionalist benefits of, say, the
provision limiting the President's term of office, if we can say that the
whole Constitution is common ground than we are if we routinely disregard
parts of the Constitution and try to insist that only certain clauses are
binding.
Our Constitution is, in certain important ways, very well designed to
serve as common ground. It is sometimes objected that the conventionalist
justification is too cold-blooded: It seems to reduce the Constitution from
being a quasi-sacred document, the product of the Framers' genius, to being
a desiccated focal point. If this were true, then the conventionalist
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justification might be another sectarian account, not something that can
serve as part of an overlapping consensus among different conceptions of
American citizenship. But it is by no means an implication of
conventionalism that the Constitution is "merely" a focal point. On the
contrary, it takes a certain kind of genius to construct a document that uses
language specific enough to resolve some potential controversies entirely
and to narrow the range of disagreement on others, but also uses language
general enough not to force on a society outcomes that are so unacceptable
that they discredit the document.
The genius of the Constitution is that it is specific where specificity is
valuable, general where generality is valuable-and that it does not put us
in unacceptable situations that we can't plausibly interpret our way out of.
There is reason to think the Framers were self-conscious about this, for
example in their elliptical (albeit doomed) treatment of slavery in the
original document. Edmund Randolph gave essentially this advice to the
Committee on Detail at the Constitutional Convention: "[T]he draught of a
fundamental constitution," he said, should include "essential principles
only; lest the operations of government should be clogged by rendering
those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be
accommodated to times and events." 4'
Our political culture today seems to have internalized the requirements
of conventionalism: that there is a time for specificity in the Constitution,
but there is also a time for generality that will allow interpretive flexibility
in the future. People seem to recognize, for example, that when
constitutional amendments address large-scale problems, they should be
written in general terms; it is commonly said that the Constitution should
not be "cluttered up" with amendments that are too specific or that respond
too narrowly to particular current controversies.4 2 But at the same time, we
are willing to add highly specific amendments to the Constitution, such as
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, providing for presidential disability, or the
Twentieth Amendment, specifying the dates when the President will be
inaugurated and Congress will convene.
One important implication of conventionalism is that this choice
between generality and specificity is a crucial constitutional decision. That
is why originalism is, despite its pretensions, inconsistent with the true
genius of the Constitution. At least this is so if originalism means that
whenever the text of a constitutional provision is unclear, the
understandings of those who adopted the provision will govern until the
provision is formally amended. That approach takes provisions that the
41.

See SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787, at 183 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
42. See, e.g., Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, "GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS":
DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 9-25 (1999).
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Framers left general and makes them specific. The drafters and ratifiers of
the First Amendment may well have thought that blasphemy could be
prohibited; the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought
that racial segregation and gender discrimination were acceptable. Had the
amendments said those things, in terms that could not be escaped by
subsequent interpreters, our Constitution would work less well today.
But the text does not express those specific judgments. As a result,
instead of having to read the First or Fourteenth Amendments out of the
Constitution, we are able to read our own content into them-following a
common law approach-and then use those provisions, interpreted in that
way, to enhance the prestige of the Constitution as a whole. That, in turn,
more thoroughly entrenches the specific, focal provisions of the
Constitution. The Constitution as a whole commands allegiance more
readily when the Equal Protection Clause is interpreted to outlaw stateenforced segregation rather than in the way the ratifiers of that Clause
understood it. Making the general provisions specific, as originalists would,
undoes this ingenious project.
C. Conventionalism Beyond the Text
Conventionalism therefore provides a justification for a practicepaying attention to the words of the Constitution-that Jefferson's
argument calls into question. But other things, besides the text, can serve as
focal points, and the conventionalist justification need not be limited to the
text. Precedents can be focal; original understandings can be focal. The use
of such focal points is often almost instinctive, as one might expect; it is a
characteristic of a useful focal point that adherence to it seems natural.
Whatever the focal point, however, when adherence to a position rests on
conventionalist grounds, the extent of adherence cannot outrun the
justification. If the justification fcr following the original understanding on
a particular point is the conventionalist justification, then following the
original understanding is justified, speaking roughly, only so long as the
costs of unsettlement (including the "cost" of unfairness, if one is departing
from a rule while taking advantage of others' compliance) are greater than
43
the benefits that might come from the departure.
There is an important connection between the conventionalist and
common law justifications for our constitutional practices. Conventionalist

43. This identifies a difference between stare decisis and common law constitutionalism.
Following recent precedents on specific issues is conventionalist. The Burkean or bounded
rationality justifications are limited to longer-standing principles. On these points, see generally
Young, supra note 32.
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44
ideas were a central part of classical common law ideology, and the
importance of focal points is an indispensable part of the justification for
the common law approach to constitutional interpretation. If past decisions
were respected only because they reflected accumulated wisdom, then there
would be no obvious reason to give priority to past American decisions.
Decisions from other countries might be equally useful, indeed more useful,
if they arose from circumstances that more closely resemble current
American conditions. The present-day United States obviously resembles
late-twentieth-century Canada more closely than it resembles nineteenthcentury America. Information on how current Canadian law resolves certain
issues might play a role in American legal arguments. But Canadian law,
however recent and relevant, does not have the precedential effect of even a
distant American decision. That is a settled aspect of our practices, and the
common law account, in itself, does not filly explain it.
If there is a justification for that aspect of our practices, that
justification must rest on conventionalist ideas. American law could surely
profit from a more systematic consideration of what other countries do.45
But it would be very difficult for a decisionmaker to have to consider an
undifferentiated collection of precedents and institutions from multiple
legal cultures. It is much more manageable to deal just with the relatively
coherent body of American (national) law. The potential gain from drawing
on the accumulated wisdom of many societies would be outweighed by the
unmanageability of the task. A relatively coherent body of law is at hand;
that body of law is not obviously inferior to others; and, strictly as a matter
of cultural fact, there is widespread acceptance of the use of that body of
law. The conventionalist argument is that, in these circumstances, it is
better to look only to that body of law.

D. Conventionalism and the Overlapping Consensus
Jefferson's argument suggests that any form of adherence to decisions
made in the past is irrational or, worse, both irrational and oppressive. The
common law and conventionalist justifications for paying attention to the
Constitution are consistent with that skeptical approach: They provide
reasons for adhering to the text of the Constitution, and (to a limited degree)
original understandings, that do not depend on anything that even a
skeptical Jeffersonian could fairly call ancestor worship. But it is also
important that the common law and common ground justifications not
require one to adopt Jefferson's form of skepticism.
44. See, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 110-43
(1986).

45. For a discussion of the usefilness of such comparisons, see VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK
TUSHNFT, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144-89 (1999).
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The solidarity needed to make a functioning political society has many
cultural and emotional sources. It is not reasonable to expect people to
continue to adhere to political institutions without having, or developing,
affective ties to those institutions. A justification for a legal practice cannot
treat those affective ties as misguided, or as the product of a kind of useful
delusion. The justification cannot itself have a quasi-ethnic or quasireligious character, but it has to be able to appeal to people who, unlike
Jefferson, attach moral importance to the relationship between generations.
Someone who believes that being an American means joining an
ongoing tradition that began with the Framers can-indeed, should-fully
embrace the common law and common ground justifications. The common
law approach provides a way to understand the idea of an ongoing
American tradition. The common ground approach can be understood to
assert precisely that one thing Americans have in common is allegiance to
the text of the Constitution. The skeptic would adhere to the text (in the
way required by the common ground argument) just because it is useful and
fair to do so. People with more elaborate views about the provenance of the
Constitution will have other reasons for adhering to the text. But those
people can also fully endorse the common ground arguments without
feeling that they must regard their more elaborate views about American
traditions as irrational. Those more elaborate views just give them
additional, strong reasons to endorse the common ground arguments.
The common law and common ground justifications might, of course,
require some people to modify views they hold about the Constitution.
Someone who believed that the Framers were divinely inspired would find
much to accept in the common law and common ground accounts, butdepending on exactly what it means to be divinely inspired-might have to
forgo some claims, as well. The common law and common ground accounts
do not justify an uncritical adherence to the original understandings, for
example. But for two reasons, it is acceptable for the common law and
common ground accounts to require people to modify their understandings
of the Constitution, so long as those accounts allow room for a wide range
of conceptions of American traditions and American identity and do not
require skepticism of Jefferson's kind.
First, the common law and common ground justifications provide
reasons to adhere to the Constitution that can be, and should be, accepted
by everyone. To go beyond those justifications is to impose a particular
quasi-ethnic (or quasi-religious) conception of American identity. That
should not be the basis for governing a diverse liberal society. People are
entitled to hold such a conception of American identity and not to have
their views disparaged, but people cannot insist that others comply with that
conception. They can insist that others go as far as the common law and
common ground justifications dictate, but they cannot insist on more.
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Second, the common law and common ground accounts are consistent
with current practices in the way that a more thoroughgoing commitment to
the original understandings, for example, is not. As I have said, much of
current constitutional law conforms to the common law model. Someone
who wanted to reject the common law model in favor of an original
understanding approach not only would be relying on a sectarian
justification but would be overturning important and thoroughly settled
constitutional principles about race and gender discrimination, freedom of
expression, and a number of other subjects. And, as I am about to argue, the
common ground approach is consistent with the way in which the text of
the Constitution operates in practice.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AFTER JEFFERSON

The common law and common ground justifications provide an answer
to Jefferson's question that does not require people to accept a specific,
sectarian conception of American citizenship. But these justifications are
important for more concrete purposes as well. They account for many
aspects of our constitutional system that are well settled, but that seem, at
first glance, hard to explain.
In particular, these justifications explain why the text of the
Constitution seems to matter more for less important questions-seemingly
an inversion of the way the Constitution should be interpreted. They also
explain a kind of verbal fetishism that seems to characterize the way the
text is used: The words of the text can justify a decision even when the
original understandings of the words would require a different decision.
And these justifications explain why arguments that do invoke original
understandings are so often characterized by "law-office history"--the
selective use of sources to support a position, rather than an effort truly to
reconstruct the understandings of an earlier time-and why the use of lawoffice history is, despite the dismissive term, acceptable.
Finally, the common law and common ground justifications provide
answers to some unsettled problems of constitutional interpretation. They
explain what should be done when an apparently well-established line of
precedent appears to be inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the text.
And they shed light on a question that is not currently salient but that may
become so: whether the effect of an apparently authoritative command from
the People-an amendment of the Constitution designed to secure a specific
result-can change over time.
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A. Why the Text Matters Morefor Less Important Questions
It appears to be a persistent feature of our constitutional practice that
the text of the Constitution matters most when the least important issues are
at stake. "The Court offers a formal analysis in insignificant cases ... and
formless balancing in more serious cases. 46 This seems anomalous: If the
text is important because of the authority of those who adopted it, or
because it represents the will of an intergenerational community, then the
text should be the primary source of law when the issues are most
important. But instead, when the most momentous issues are on the table,
the text tends to disappear. When the questions are relatively technical, the
text is often the principal focus.
The so-called structural provisions of the Constitution-the provisions
of the original Constitution that allocate powers among the branches and
between the states and the federal government-provide the clearest
examples. Many of the structural provisions of the original Constitution are
relatively precise. One would expect those provisions to be applied in a way
that emphasized the text and eschewed more general arguments of policy.
As several commentators have noted, however, the Supreme Court's
decisions in this area seem to vacillate between the highly "formalistic" and
the more "functional." In the "formalistic" decisions, the Court's opinion
focuses closely on the language of the Constitution and pays little attention
to more general policy concerns; the "functional" opinions pay little
attention to the text of the Constitution and instead emphasize, for example,
the policies underlying the separation of powers, or the policies that might
justify legislation that seems inconsistent with the separation of powers.4 7
But the vacillation is not random. When the Court had to decide
whether the President could seize steel mills, assert executive privilege in a
criminal investigation of his associates, or conclude an agreement for the
release of hostages held by a foreign power-in, respectively, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,48 United States v. Nixon, 49 and Dames &
Moore v. Regan50 -it paid little attention to specific textual provisions.
Indeed, Justice Jackson's celebrated opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co., which provided the template for much of the law in the area, begins
with an explicit disclaimer about the "poverty of really useful and

46. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1340 (1994) (lamenting this tendency).
47. In particular, see Peter L. Strauss, Formaland FunctionalApproaches to Separation-ofPowers Questions-aFoolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987); and Rebecca L.
Brown, SeparatedPowers and OrderedLiberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (1991).
48. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
49. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
50. 453 U.S. 654(1981).
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unambiguous authority" in the text and in other historical sources. 5' When
the Court ruled that the President is absolutely immune from civil actions
arising out of the conduct of his office, it brushed aside a substantial textual
argument to the contrary and relied entirely on functional concerns. 52 In its
opinion upholding the independent counsel statute, the Court rejected the
argument that the prosecutorial function is part of the "Executive Power"
vested in the President by Article 11, Section 1, by asserting, in a similar
functional vein, that the statute did not "unduly interfer[e] with the role of
the Executive Branch."53 The opinion upholding the United States
Sentencing Commission took a similar approach.54
Textual arguments become central only when the stakes are lower.
Perhaps the most notoriously "formalist" opinion is INS v. Chadha, which
declared the legislative veto unconstitutional. 55 The Court in Chadha relied
on what it characterized as "[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the
Constitution" 56 and pointedly refused to consider whether the legislative
veto was "efficient, convenient, [or] useful in facilitating functions of the
government., 57 There is a difference of opinion over how important
Chadha was, 58 but it is at least clear that the legislative veto was seldom
exercised,5 9 that Congress had plausible substitutes for the legislative
veto, 60 and that the decision in Chadha did not approach-in practical

51. See 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
52. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing an
explicit immunity to senators and representatives).
53. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988).
54. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (quoting Justice Jackson's
Youngstown Sheet & Tube opinion, and adopting a "pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated
governmental power").
55. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
56. Id. at 945.
57. Id. at 944.
58. Justice White's dissent in Chadha asserted that the decision was "of surpassing
importance," although he may have meant only that it invalidated a large number of legislative
veto provisions, not that those provisions were themselves of great importance. See id. at 967
(White, J., dissenting). At least one commentator has taken the position that the approach adopted
in Chadha, if generalized, would significantly affect the structure of the Constitution. Victoria
Nourse, Toward a New Anatomy of Constitutional Structure (Nov. 12, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Eskridge and Ferejohn make a parallel argument, but note that
Chadha is an outlier: "The Court's results and reasoning in other constitutional cases suggest that
the Court itself has not internalized its Chadha understanding of Article I, Section 7 .
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 24, at 558.
59. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha. The Administrative Constitution, the
Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 151 ("It is certainly true that
Congress seldom actually invokes the legislative veto."). Elliott does go on to assert that the
infrequent use of the veto does not establish its unimportance. Id. at 152.
60. See Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative
Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1420-23 (1977); Elliott, supra
note 59, at 156-57; Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Action To Overturn Agency Rules:
Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 667 (1980). See generally David A.
Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 U. VA. L.
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significance or political salience-the decisions in Youngstown Sheet and
Tube, United States v. Nixon, Dames & Moore, or, probably, the
independent counsel or sentencing commission cases. Moreover, whatever
the significance of Chadha, the Court followed a formalistic approach
similar to Chadha's in relying on the text to resolve a series of relatively
technical questions under the Appointments Clause, questions that were
than many of those involved in the more
indisputably less important
61
decisions.
"functional"
In a sense, this pattern should not be surprising: When the Court
decides cases concerning intensely controversial subjects like equality or
reproductive freedom, text and original understandings are left far behind.
In fact, in area after area-freedom of expression, state sovereign
immunity, the Takings Clause-it is difficult to identify any case in which
the language of the Constitution plays an operative role in the analysis.
According to the usual justifications for adhering to the text-the
Austinian account or one that emphasizes intergenerational communitythis practice is perverse. But conventionalism makes sense of it. When the
stakes are high, people are less likely to accept a solution just for the sake
of having the matter resolved with minimal friction. They are willing to live
with controversy as the price of trying to resolve the issue in the way they
think is correct. The text becomes important only when it is more important
that the issue be settled than that it be settled just right. Some separation-ofpowers issues are like that. It is important to have settled which acts are
valid, which political actor must make which decision, and the like. The
abstract correctness of those decisions often matters less than having them
decided; the benefits of having the matter settled outweigh the costs of
reaching what might be the wrong answer. Consequently, our practices are
more formalistic.
There are certainly some exceptions to the generalization that the text
matters most for the least important questions, but those exceptions tend to
bear out the conventionalist justification: They occur when the costs of
unsettlement are so great that even important provisions should be
interpreted formalistically. The provision that each state have two senators
is an example. It is unthinkable that a court would declare that provision
unconstitutional as a violation of the principle of one person, one voteeven though such a result would probably be no more at odds with the
original understandings than the Supreme Court's actual reapportionment
decisions. But here, too, the adherence to the provision is best understood
on conventionalist grounds. The provision is entirely clear (indeed, it is
REv. 253, 288-90 (1982); Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System
Overload, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 19, 24.

61. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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entrenched in the Constitution, purportedly against constitutional
amendments-Article V provides that no state may be deprived of its equal
representation in the Senate without its consent). 62 It is extremely salient,
and the subject it addresses is very sensitive because it affects what counts
as a validly enacted law. A constitutional decision at odds with the clear
language would therefore be highly destabilizing, and the conventionalist
argument for adhering to the ordinary meaning of this provision-instead of
instituting a common law movement toward a state of affairs that might be
more justifiable as a matter of morality-is very strong.63
B.

Verbal Fetishism and the IncorporationDebate

The conventionalist answer to Jefferson's argument guides the
interpretation of the text in a straightforward way. It suggests that, other
things equal, the text should be interpreted in the way best calculated to
serve as common ground: to provide a focal point of agreement and to
avoid the costs of reopening every question. In a sense there is nothing
"inherent" in the text, whatever that might mean, that tells us that the
President's "Term of four Years" means four years on the Gregorian
calendar. Nor do we interpret the text that way because we want to maintain
fidelity to long-ago generations. We break faith with them (if that is the
right way to put it) over much more important issues. We interpret the text
in the obvious and natural way because that is most likely to settle the issue
once and for all without further controversy.
The same is true when the text only narrows the range of disagreement
instead of specifying an answer. The reason we do not engage in fancy
forms of interpretation that would permit us to question the length of the
President's term, or the citizenship qualification, or other "textual"
resolutions of issues, is that the leading function of the text-to provide a
ready-made solution that is widely acceptable-would be subverted by
interpretations of the text that struck most people as contrived.
There is, of course, no issue about the President's term and the
Gregorian calendar. But in other contexts, this implication of
conventionalism becomes quite important. In particular, it explains the
aspect of our practices that might otherwise seem like verbal fetishismattaching undue significance to the happenstance of what words are used in
the text-including the role that text played in the debate over whether the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights.

62. U.S. CONST. art. V.

63. Even so, the conventionalist justification has its limits; in times of the greatest stress, such
as Reconstruction, this provision was arguably disregarded. For a discussion, see John Harrison,
The Lawfidness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375, 385-87 (2001).
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Perhaps the most vivid illustration of this approach to the text is the
interpretation of the provision of the Sixth Amendment that gives a criminal64
defendant the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
There is little doubt that the original understanding of this provision was
that the government may not forbid a criminal defendant from hiring 66a
65
lawyer with his own money. Today, of course, Gideon v. Wainwright
and subsequent decisions have established that in serious criminal
prosecutions the government must provide counsel even for defendants who
cannot afford it. That rule fits comfortably with the language, and the
language has been used to support it. But in fact it is just a coincidencealmost a matter of homonymy-that the modem right to counsel is
supported by the language of the Sixth Amendment. The drafters of the
Sixth Amendment might have used some other language to express their
intentions, language that would have made it more difficult to find support
for the modem right (for example, that the accused shall have the right "to
retain counsel for his defense").
At first glance, it seems odd to use the language of the Sixth
Amendment to support Gideon when it is only a coincidence that it does
67
But on the conventionalist account, this use of the language begins to
so.
make sense: So long as a court can show that its interpretation of the
Constitution can be reconciled with some plausible ordinary meaning of the
text-so long as it can plausibly say that it honors the text-the text can
continue to serve the conventionalist function of narrowing disagreement.
Original understandings are often hard to ascertain and are therefore
unlikely to become focal points in any event; a departure from them is
therefore not very costly. But once a judge or other official asserts the
power to act in ways inconsistent with the text, the ability of the text to
serve the common ground function is weakened. That is why it makes sense
to adhere to the text even while disregarding the Framers' intentions.
Probably the most impressive example of this aspect of our practices is
the application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the so-called incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights
64. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
65, See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640. 660-66 (1948); WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-33 (1955).

66. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
67. For an argument against such an approach to the constitutional text (characterized as
"nonoriginalist texualism"), see Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of ParticularConceptions of
ConstitutionalInterpretation,77 VA. L. REv. 669, 689-91 (1991). See also Steven D. Smith, Law
Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 114-15 (1989) (arguing against such an approach to
statutory interpretation). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutorv Interpretation,87
MICH. L. REV. 20, 59-60 (1988) (defending, although not on conventionalist grounds, such an
approach to statutory interpretation). For a sustained account of the Founding generation's view of
how meaning should be assigned to the text an account generally inconsistent with using
present-day meanings-see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI.
L. REv. 519 (2003).
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originally applied only to the federal government. In a series of decisions,
mostly in the 1960s, the Supreme Court applied to the states essentially all
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights that protect criminal defendants.68
The effect was to bring about a large-scale reform of the criminal justice
systems of the states. These decisions were the culmination of a protracted
argument, mostly between Justices Black and Frankfurter (and their
respective followers outside the Court), over the appropriateness of
incorporation.69
Three things seem clear about the incorporation issue. First, it went
from being a subject of intense controversy-probably the most
controversial issue in constitutional law between the mid-1940s and mid1950s, and one of the most controversial for a decade or more thereafterto being a completely settled issue. The incorporation controversy involved
the most divisive matters-criminal justice, federalism, and, implicitly,
race. But by the mid-1980s, even the most severe critics of the Warren
Court accepted incorporation, and some of them aggressively embraced it.
Second, incorporation came to be a settled issue even though it was not
widely accepted that incorporation was consistent with the intentions of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. During the time that incorporation
took hold in the legal culture, the received wisdom was that the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend incorporation.7 0 Recent historical
scholarship has seriously questioned that received wisdom."1 But
incorporation became uncontroversial long before any new historical
understanding took hold in the legal culture generally. What the
incorporation controversy and its denouement reveal about our practices is
that-so far as the acceptance of incorporation in the legal culture was
concerned-the Framers' intentions were essentially beside the point.

68. The series of decisions is recounted in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 702-09 (4th ed. 2001).

69. For example, in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), compare the concurring
opinion of Justice Frankfurter, id. at 59, with the dissenting opinion of Justice Black, id. at 68. See
generally JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 130 (1989).

70. The received view is reflected in what was perhaps the leading work of constitutional
theory of the time, ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, TIlE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 101-02 (2d ed.
1986), in which the author observed that the "weight of opinion among disinterested observers" is
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend incorporation. Charles Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,
2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949), reprinted in CHARLES FAIRMAN & STANLEY MORRISON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY 85 (1970)

was widely thought to have established that incorporation was inconsistent with the original
understandings. See also FALLON, supra note 2, at 144 n.22; id. at 15 ("It is at best questionable

whcthcr the framers and ratifiers of any constitutional provision understood themselves as having
made the Bill of Rights applicable against the states .... ").
71.

AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998);

MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE

BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
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Third, and most striking, despite the fact that there are textual
difficulties with incorporation that its proponents never fully worked outunder the incorporation doctrine, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment seems, at first glance, redundant 72-the widespread acceptance
of incorporation has something to do with its use of the text. It helped
enormously that the Court was reforming state criminal justice systems on
the basis of conceptions that had some link to the text of the Bill of Rights,
rather than on the basis of principles that did not have as explicit a textual
foundation. It seems unlikely that the Court's reform project would have
succeeded in the way it did if the Court-instead of invoking the text of the
Bill of Rights to aid its campaign-had simply devised a new set of rules
for the states to follow, however sensible those rules might have been.
Since there was no general belief that the Framers (of either the Bill of
Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment) contemplated that the text would be
viewed in this way, and since the text doesn't immediately lend itself to that
interpretation, why should the textual basis of incorporation matter so
much? If we don't care about what the Framers thought they were doing,
why do we care so much about the words they wrote? The conventionalist
answer is that by connecting reforms of state criminal justice systems to the
text of the Bill of Rights, the incorporation doctrine used the Constitution as
a focal point. That is, in the face of widespread disagreement about criminal
justice, the Court could take advantage of the fact that everyone thinks the
words of the Constitution should count for something. People who might
have disagreed vigorously about the merits of various reforms of the
criminal justice system could all treat the specific rights acknowledged in
the Bill of Rights as common ground that would limit the scope of their
disagreement. A reform program that had a plausible connection to the text
of the Bill of Rights was therefore more likely to be accepted than one that
did not.
It is in this sense that incorporation is "consistent with the Constitution"
in a way that a nontextual program of criminal law reform would not be.
The point is not that the Framers, or the people, acting in 1789 or 1868,
commanded the reforms that the Court undertook. As many other examples
show, those are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of a
constitutional development. The Court undertook the reforms of the
incorporation era, and the reforms lasted, because they made moral and
practical sense, and because, by virtue of their connection to the text,
society could reach agreement (or at least narrow the range of
disagreement) on a legal outcome even in the face of deep moral
disagreement.

72. For an argument that the redundancy is only apparent and does not present an obstacle to
incorporation, see AMAR, supra note 71, at 171-74, 364 n.42.
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C. Law-Office History
Historians, understandably, often criticize the use of history in legal
controversies; they say that lawyers' use of history seems to involve not an
effort to reconstruct the climate of an earlier generation but rather a picking
and choosing of sources that will support a thesis that is arrived at for other,
normative reasons. 73 The characterization seems generally accurate; the
training of lawyers and historians is quite different. And as much as legal
academics do "law-office history," courts and advocates-even the most
historically sophisticated among them-are far worse. The selectivity is
overt, and the effort to arrive at a contextual understanding of the past is all
but nonexistent.
The use of law-office history is a standing rebuke to the traditional
explanations for why we care about the Framers. If the objective of
constitutional interpretation were to maintain fidelity or continuity with the
normative vision of earlier generations, lawyers' and judges' characteristic
uses of history would be a scandal. Lawyers are constantly reworking the
alleged normative vision of earlier generations to serve their own, presentday, purposes. But there is no reason to think lawyers and judges will stop
using law-office history any time soon; it appears to be a persistent feature
.
of the legal culture 74
The common law and common ground justifications-particularly the
former-do explain this practice, however, and show that it is not
necessarily a scandal. We treat the views of the Founding generation in the
way we would treat precedents. Sometimes we accept those views,
sometimes we modify them, sometimes we just reject them-just as with
old precedents. A lot depends on what has happened since the time the
Framers' statements were made. If subsequent developments seem to bear
out the wisdom of what was said in 1787, the fact that it was said in 1787 is
an additional point in its favor. But if an argument made by a prominent
Framer quickly disappeared and has had no influence in the intervening
years, we seldom revive it. The use of law-office history would be a scandal
if it were generally determinative of constitutional issues, but it is not.
Evidence of original understandings has only limited value, and then only
73. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 5 (1988); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite'"in Modern
American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Friedman & Smith, supra note 2;
Leonard W. Levy, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill ofRights, in JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1972); Jack N. Rakovc, Two
Foxes in the Forest of History, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191 (1999). See generally Alfred H.
Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119.
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An lli~cit
74. See, e.g., CHARLES A.

MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY

(1969); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency,Pragmatism, and Critiqueof
Historv in Adjudication andLegal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2000).
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if it is validated by practice in the intervening years, or by normative
arguments about fairness or good policy. So limited, this use of history is
defensible.75
This understanding of the use of the Framers' intentions explains
several things that the usual accounts cannot explain. On an Austinian view,
one would try to identify some sovereign, and its, or their, intentions would
be binding. But that is not how evidence of original intentions is used in our
system. Original intentions or understandings are seldom decisive. On
several important issues, current law is at odds with original
understandings. Notoriously, the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment was that school segregation and gender discrimination were
acceptable, at least according76 to a near-unanimous consensus. There are
many other examples as well.
Also, it is quite unclear whose intentions or understandings matter. If
there is an Austinian sovereign behind the Constitution, it is probably the
people who attended the state ratifying conventions. This appears to have
been Madison's view, at least at one point. 77 But materials from the
ratifying conventions are cited indiscriminately with many other kinds of
materials; they have no special status. One can use Madison's notes of the
Convention to good effect even though they were not available to the
people who ratified the Constitution. The Federalist Papers are treated as
an authoritative source, although they were advocacy pieces that one would
expect not to lay bare the most controversial aspects of the Constitution.
Statements of the Framers are cited indiscriminately with those of
prominent non-Framers (like Jefferson) and those of participants in the state
ratifying conventions. Some Framers count for more than others; a good
quotation from Madison is probably worth more than evidence of the views
of the members of several state ratifying conventions. On an Austinian
view, the most important task would be to identify the sovereign; only its,
or their, intentions matter. If the objective is to maintain our connection to
the American People, defined over time, then we should be careful to try to
determine what the actual earlier generations believed, not just what a few
75. "'History in the service of life can never be scientific history-- Posner, supra note 74, at
578 n.8 (quoting Werner Dannhauser, Introduction to History in the Service and Disservice of
Life, in FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, UNMODERN OBSERVATIONS 73, 79 (William Arrowsmith ed.,

1990)).
76. See, e.g., FALLON, supranote 2, at 15-17.

77. Madison's statement was: "If we were to look therefore, for the meaning of [the
Constitution], beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it not in the general convention,
which proposed, but in the state conventions, which accepted and ratified the constitution." James
Madison, Jay's Treaty (Apr. 6, 1796), in 16 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 290, 296 (J.C.A.

Stagg et al. eds., 1989). For an account of how Madison's views changed over time, see JACK
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

339-65 (1996). For a modem endorsement of this view, see Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.

L. REV. 226, 275-79 (1988). For a sophisticated challenge to this view, see Nelson, supra note 67.
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very prominent individuals thought. But our actual use of historical
evidence seems deliberately to ignore these very issues.
Once we understand that the Framers' views are not authoritative
commands but are instead akin to precedents, however, these practices
become less puzzling. We don't carefully distinguish Framers from ratifiers
because they all matter a little. Those whose judgments we think we have
other reasons to trust, like Madison, count for more, in the same way that an
opinion by Holmes or Brandeis counts for more. But we will contravene
even a clear original understanding when we are convinced that it is wrong,
just as we will overrule a precedent sometimes.
That is why a persuasive argument that, say, James Madison would
have disapproved of the independent counsel statute will, in practice,
advance the case for the unconstitutionality of the statute, even if we cannot
show that Madison's understanding was widely shared; but strong evidence
that the Fourteenth Amendment was widely understood not to have
anything to do with voting rights has simply been cast aside. Clear evidence
of the original understanding would be crucial if we were, contra Jefferson,
subordinating ourselves to the decisions of an earlier generation. But
instead of doing that, lawyers making constitutional arguments follow the
common law model. They make selective use of the wisdom of the past,
modified by normative considerations, to address current problems. That
use of the past is not history, in the usual sense-but then it is also not
ancestor worship. It is a use of the past that is consistent with Jeffersonian
skepticism, and it illustrates another way in which the common law and
common ground accounts not only answer Jefferson but fit with settled
legal practices.
D. Precedent Versus Text
What should be done when a consistent and long-standing line of
precedent seems squarely in conflict with the text of the Constitution?
Should the Supreme Court adhere to the precedents, even after it becomes
convinced that this conflict exists? Self-styled textualists and originalists
answer in the negative; they assert that the precedent, which is not the "real
78
Constitution," must give way to the text, which is. But this claim cannot
be justified, at least not without much more argument.

78. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional
Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 408 (1988); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case
Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 27-28 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1548 n,38 (2000); see also Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466,491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The Fourth Amendment provides an illustration. Current Fourth
Amendment law-which presumptively requires a warrant before a search
may be conducted-is hard to reconcile with the plain language of the
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, read naturally, seems not to
require warrants, but only to limit their availability. The original
understanding, so far as we can tell, seems to bear out that reading of the
text. Here again, the established gloss seems to have superseded the
language; the "warrant requirement" has been read into the text, in
somewhat the same way that "separation of church and state" has been read
into the Establishment Clause.
It has been powerfully argued that, notwithstanding the precedents, the
Fourth Amendment should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with
the plain language and original understandings: Searches should be
allowed, even without a warrant, if they are reasonable, and the Fourth
Amendment's limit on the availability of warrants should be viewed as a
way of keeping government officials from claiming immunity against civil
suits. 79 Good arguments can be made in support of this view. But the text is
among the least important of them. If this revisionist view of the Fourth
Amendment should be adopted, it should be adopted principally because it
is more sensible-for example, if the warrant requirement serves no useful
purpose in restraining the power to search and operates only as an arbitrary
limit on law enforcement.
If that argument in support of the revisionist view of the Fourth
Amendment is correct, the fact that the text supports it is significant for two
purposes. First, it weakens the argument that departing from the "warrant
requirement" would be destabilizing in conventionalist terms. The presence
of textual support for the revisionist interpretation would help ensure that
the common ground function of the text would be unimpaired; indeed, the
ability of the text to serve as common ground might be enhanced by a
decision that more obviously followed the text. Second, the language of the
Amendment serves approximately the same role as an old precedent. The
language of the Amendment strengthens the case for the revisionist
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in roughly the same way that a
Marshall Court precedent would: It suggests that some people whose views
we should take seriously supported the revisionist interpretation.
The one thing that should not be accepted, however, is the claim that
changing Fourth Amendment doctrine to make it more consistent with the
text is a matter of jettisoning "mere precedent" in favor of "the
Constitution." The priority of the text has to be justified. Sometimes

79. This position was originally advanced in TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 38-45 (1969) and renewed in AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 31-45 (1997).

HeinOnline -- 112 Yale L.J. 1751 2002-2003

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

1752

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 112: 1717

conventionalism justifies it. But in this instance more justification is
needed. The text has been heavily glossed, providing another focal point,
and the current law is not wholly irreconcilable with the text. There is an
accumulation of precedent favoring the current view. If we insisted that the
Framers' (presumably) different view about warrants is enough to overturn
that accumulated precedent, we would be doing what Jefferson condemned:
exalting the judgments of an earlier generation without adequate reason.
The revisionist view may or may not be correct in the end. But the case for
the revisionist view must rest primarily on its claim to superiority as a
matter of policy, and only secondarily on the text.
E. The Constitution and Commands
Finally, there is an issue that is not currently controverted but that could
arise, were the Constitution to be amended again. Even Jefferson did not
deny that the current generation may govern itself. But the common law
and common ground views do not seem to leave any room for that. Does
the Austinian view-that the Constitution is, in some sense, a legitimate
command that people are obligated to obey-have any remaining
significance?
All the provisions of our Constitution that give rise to litigation are
quite old. In recent years there appear to have been no significant cases
decided under any amendment more recent than the Twenty-First, added in
1933. (There was litigation under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment,
outlawing poll taxes, soon after its adoption, but such litigation seems
unlikely to recur, at least on a large scale.) As a result, constitutional law
today does not really illustrate the intertemporal nature of interpretation.
Everything is more than a generation old, however generations are counted;
the common law and common ground justifications for obedience therefore
predominate.
But things do not have to remain that way. If an amendment were
added to the Constitution, the Austinian justification could reassert itself,
for a time. In virtually every session of Congress, for example, a
constitutional amendment is proposed that would specify, in one way or
8°
another, that "voluntary prayer" is to be permitted in the public schools. It
is generally understood that the purpose of such an amendment is to
overrule a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning with School District
v. Schempp,8' which held that it was unconstitutional for a public school to
80. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 52, 107th Cong. (2001) ("Nothing in this Constitution shall be
construed to prohibit individual prayer in public schools or to prohibit public school officials from
including voluntary prayer in official school ceremonies and meetings. Neither the United States
nor any State shall prescribe the content of any such prayer.").
81. 374 U.S. 203 (1963), The development began with Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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conduct teacher-led devotional Bible reading in the classroom. Under
Schempp and other decisions, the fact that a student could leave the
classroom during the prayer was not enough to make the practice
constitutional.
Suppose such a constitutional amendment were adopted, after a debate
in which it was generally acknowledged that the purpose of the amendment
was to overrule the Supreme Court's decisions. How should a court, or any
other conscientious official (or citizen) interpret such an amendment? The
answer to this question should change over time.
Immediately after the amendment was adopted, it seems clear that the
correct interpretation of the amendment would be that it permits school
prayer of the kind banned by Schempp. This is true even though the text,
read in isolation, does not compel such a result. It is certainly plausible to
say that school prayer of that kind is not "voluntary." Indeed, that is
probably the best way to understand the basis of the Supreme Court's
decisions (although it is not quite what the opinions said). But if the public
debate on the amendment proceeded on the assumption, generally shared by
all involved, that the issue was whether the Court's decision should be
overruled, then it seems quite clear that it would be wrong for the courts or
anyone else to interpret the amendment differently. In those circumstances,
seizing on the term "voluntary" to produce a different result immediately
after the amendment was adopted would be a kind of trickery, an action
taken in bad faith.
If this is so, then one consequence is that originalism is, to a degree,
rehabilitated from various attacks other than Jefferson's. Obviously there
will be some problems in asserting that "everyone knows" or "everyone
understood" that the purpose of the amendment was to overrule Schempp.
Some people, somewhere, might not have understood that. In fact, during
the debate some people would undoubtedly have made the argument that
the amendment, as drafted, did not accomplish the effect the drafters
sought, because it referred only to "voluntary" prayer. But it would still be
possible for people living at the time to say, with confidence, that the
provision was generally understood to overrule Schempp. To that extent,
one of the common criticisms of originalism-that it is impossible in
principle to identify an original understanding-seems mistaken.
Over time, though, the interpretation of a voluntary prayer amendment
could appropriately change. For Jefferson's reason, it would be acceptable
for an interpreter to say, a few decades down the road, that although
teacher-led school prayer was considered "voluntary" when the amendment
was adopted, we have now come to understand, in the light of experience,
that such prayer is never really voluntary, and that therefore the amendment
should be understood only to allow prayer that is not officially sponsored.
This would be inconsistent with the original understanding of the
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amendment, but consistent with its language. Such an explicit reversal and
rejection of the acknowledged original intent might seem jarring. But this
is, in substance, no different from the most generally accepted justification
for Brown v. Board of Education.82 At one time it was thought that school
segregation was consistent with equality; now we understand otherwise.
Similarly, in Minor v. Happersett,83 the Supreme Court, citing textual and
historical evidence, held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
enfranchise women because it did not apply to voting; although the specific
holding in Minor had to be reversed by constitutional amendment, its
reasoning has now been emphatically rejected, without any serious
reconsideration of the historical record. The hypothetical school prayer
amendment would be different to the extent that it reversed an earlier
Supreme Court decision, and this would be an additional reason for caution
in moving away from the original understanding of the amendment. But
otherwise the cases are parallel.
The justification for such a break with original understandings would
have to be, as usual, a common law one. One would have to show that, even
giving due deference to the judgment of those who adopted the provision,
the conclusion they reached should now be overturned. That showing
would be easier to make if there were a progression of cases in which the
criterion of "voluntariness," understood to permit school prayer, became
more and more difficult to apply and was gradually eroded. In any event,
one could not say that the language was irrelevant; under the hypothetical
amendment, if school prayer were to be banned, it would have to be on the
basis of an argument that was consistent with the text in some way.
One problem, of course, would be to identify the point at which a court
would be justified in abandoning the original intentions-the point
comparable to Jefferson's nineteen years. Obviously this cannot be done
with precision. The problem of defining this point is less severe than it
might seem-less severe than it was for Jefferson, who had to choose an
expiration date-because the text continues to be honored (for
conventionalist reasons), and even the original understanding has the force
of a precedent. And as with many things in a common law system, the
judgment will depend on factors that cannot be reduced to a rule: not just
the passage of time but the extent to which circumstances have changed or
new facts have emerged, the difficulty in administering the old rule in
contested cases, and so on. The one thing that seems clear is that the
interpretation of legal provisions cannot remain static. That is one
overriding lesson of Jefferson's principle.

82. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(discussing Brown).

83. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
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CONCLUSION

In the end, the way to answer Jefferson's question-how can one
generation be permitted to bind another?-is, one might say, to
accommodate Jefferson's skepticism without embracing it. Do we owe
obligations of fidelity to the generations that came before us? Should we
see ourselves as participants in an ongoing, intergenerational community of
Americans? People should be able to answer those questions in different
ways. The binding force of the Constitution should not depend on an
affirmative answer to them; but constitutional interpretation should also not
require everyone to accept a negative answer.
In some ways, it is easy to overstate the extent to which the
Constitution does bind us. Much of constitutional law is a kind of common
law, developed by precedents and traditions that depart from original
understandings and, in some instances, are in tension with the text. To that
extent, Jefferson's question need not be answered. But Jefferson's question
cannot be wholly avoided, because the text of the Constitution is, without
question, still part of the law today. The text binds us because it provides a
kind of common ground-a way to resolve certain disputes, or at least to
narrow the range of disagreement. The most resolute Jeffersonian skeptic
can understand why that is a reason to adhere to the Constitution; but so can
people who reject such skepticism and believe the Constitution to be an
integral part of an ongoing American tradition to which they themselves
belong.
The particular genius of the text of the Constitution is not that it solves
all our problems, or even that it solves the most momentous ones. Anyone
who looks to the text or the original understandings for those answers not
only will have to deal with Jefferson's principle but will seriously
misunderstand American constitutional law. But the text of the Constitution
does solve some problems, and it helps advance us toward a solution of
others. Jefferson's principle does not keep us from taking advantage of the
fact that those earlier generations have given us something very useful.
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